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The economic settlement' accompanying a marriage dissolution
may consist of one or both of the following: (1) the initial "property
settlement," sometimes referred to as a "division" of property when
only community property is involved; 2 and (2) provisions for mainte-
nance payments categorized as alimony, child support, or some com-
bination thereof. 3 The tax problems of property settlements have been
analyzed previously by the author.4 They are considered here only to
the extent necessary to distinguish property settlements paid in install-
* This article makes several assumptions solely for purposes of convenience. It
assumes that if payments are made the payor is the husband or former husband. If
payments are made by one spouse for a property interest or inchoate right of the
other spouse, the husband is presumed to be the buyer and the wife is presumed to
be the seller. If payments other than payments for property or for child support are
made, the recipient of such payments, characterized as alimony, is presumed to be
the wife. Moreover, if there are children the wife is presumed to be the custodial par-
ent, and unless otherwise specified, she is presumed to receive payments specifically
designated as child support. These assumptions are made even though federal tax re-
suits do not depend upon the sex of the payor or payee. Finally, references in the text
to "husband" or "wife" should be read to include "former husband" or "former
wife." See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 7701(a)(17) [hereinafter cited as I.R.C.] which
provides:
As used in sections 71, 152(b)(4), 215, and 682, if the husband and wife
therein referred to are divorced, wherever appropriate to the meaning of such
sections, the term "wife" shall be read "former wife" and the term "husband"
shall be read "former husband"; and, if the payments described in such sec-
tions are made by or on behalf of the wife or former wife to the husband or
former husband instead of vice versa, wherever appropriate to the meaning of
such sections, the term "husband" shall be read "wife" and the term "wife"
shall be read "husband."
** Professor of Law, University of Washington.
I. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 26.09.050 (1974) which provides that:
In entering a decree of dissolution of marriage, legal separation, or declaration
of invalidity, the court shall consider, approve, or make provision for child cus-
tody and visitation, the support of any child of the marriage entitled to sup-
port, the maintenance of either spouse, and the disposition of property and
liabilities of the parties.
The Washington Dissolution Act of 1973 is discussed in Rieke, The Dissolution Act
of 1973: From Status to Contract?, 49 WASH. L. REV. 375 (1974).
2. See WASH. REV. CODE § 26.09.080 (1974).
3. See id. § 26.09.090 (maintenance) and id. § 26.09.100 (child support).
4. Hjorth, Community Property Marital Settlements: The Problem and a Pro-
posal, 50 WASH. L. REv. 231 (1975).
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ments from periodic maintenance payments made for the support of a
former spouse, or for children of the marriage, or both.5 The primary
concerns of this article are the tax consequences of alimony6 and child
support payments.
Federal income tax law recognizes marriage as a status involving
unique tax benefits and burdens. 7 The following are examples of some
of the benefits: (1) a wage-earning spouse is not taxed on the "imputed
income" enjoyed from services rendered in the home by the other
spouse or by children of the marriage; (2) parents may obtain exemp-
tion allowances for their children 8 and certain deductions for expenses
of dependents, including expenses for medical care9 and child care.10
On the other hand, payments to or for the support of a nonworking
spouse or child are not deductible by the payor and are not income to
the beneficiaries of such payments.11 Although this rule may not be a
tax burden, it can certainly be considered to be the denial of a plau-
sible tax benefit. Another potential tax burden of marriage was estab-
lished by the Tax Reform Act of 1969 which applies four separate tax
rate schedules 12 in ascending order of severity to: (1) married individ-
uals filing joint returns (and certain surviving spouses); (2) heads of
households;' 3  (3) unmarried individuals (other than surviving
5. See Part I infra.
6. The Internal Revenue Code uses the term "periodic payments" rather than the
word "alimony." See, e.g., I.R.C. § 71. WASH. REv. CODE § 26.09.090 (1974) refers
to "maintenance" instead of alimony. The term "alimony" is used in the text because
of its common usage.
7. The impossibility of achieving total tax neutrality in this area is the subject of
a superb discussion by Professor Boris Bittker, Federal Income Taxation and the
Fanily, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1389 (1975). The article also discusses a recent legislative
proposal to achieve a "marriage-neutral federal income tax." Id. at 1395 and 1438.
See H.R. REP. No. 715, 93d Cong., Ist Sess. (1973).
8. I.R.C. § 15 1(e). Parents need not, of course, be married to obtain exemption
allowances for their children. But children are a foreseeable consequence of marriage
and exemptions for them are part of the scheme of taxation of the family unit. When
the unit is dissolved, the exemptions remain and illustrate the fact that a marriage
dissolution is not merely a reversion to the status quo ante for tax purposes.
9. I.R.C. § 213.
10. Id. § 214.
II. Gould v. Gould, 245 U.S. 151 (1917)(by implication). The Court in Gould
held that alimony paid to a divorced wife was not income to her because (a) it did
"not arise from any business transaction, but from the relation of marriage." id. at
153. quoting Audubon v. Shufeldt. 181 U.S. 575 (1901). and (b) "alimony is re-
garded as a portion of the husband's estate to which the wife is equitably entitled."
id. at 153. A fortiori. the same is true of payments before divorce. See Farid-es-
Sultaneh v. Commissioner, 160 F.2d 812 (2d Cir. 1947).
12. I.R.C. § 1.
13. The term "head of household" is defined in I.R.C. § 2(b). A head of house-
hold is an unmarried individual who provides over one-half the cost of maintaining a
household in which he or she lives with unmarried children or dependents.
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spouses); and (4) married individuals filing separate returns (and es-
tates and trusts). Whether or not these new rate schedules make mar-
riage a tax benefit or burden depends on the taxable income of each
spouse. The history and effect of these rate schedules have been exam-
ined elsewhere.14 The fourth category does not apply to unmarried
individuals, and married taxpayers will not ordinarily use it because
of its high rates. It is available in the case where one spouse, for what-
ever reason, refuses to sign a joint return with the other spouse.
Briefly, considering only the first three categories, the aggregate tax
for two individuals having equal incomes will be less if they are un-
married than if they marry. Where incomes are widely disparate, or
where one spouse has no income and the other spouse has consid-
erable income, marriage will usually cause the aggregate taxes of the
two individuals to be reduced. However, marriage has the general
effect of increasing aggregate taxable income of two individuals by
forcing them to share one standard deduction and by otherwise lim-
iting their deductions.15
It is not suggested that couples marry for tax reasons. Even if a de-
cision to marry were influenced by such motives, it would be dan-
gerous to predict whether marriage would create a tax benefit or tax
burden. If both spouses intend to remain employed at approximately
equal salaries, a marriage tax burden can be expected, but if one
spouse becomes unemrloyed (as the term is commonly used--disre-
garding employment in the home), marriage may yield a tax benefit.16
Neither is it suggested that couples divorce in order to lessen aggre-
gate tax burdens. But, at least in theory, divorce almost always can
result in a decreased tax burden on the combined income of a former
husband and a former wife. It can do so because Internal Revenue
14. See Bittker, supra note 7.
15. I.R.C. §§ 141(b) & (d), 142.
16. It is easy to assert that existing law imposes a "penalty" on married couples
and discourages employment by both spouses. See Blumberg, Sexism in the Code: A
Comparative Study of Income Taxation of Working Wives and Mothers, 21 BUFF.
L. REV. 49 (1971); Richards, Discrimination Against Married Couples Under Present
Income Tax Laws, 49 TAXEs 526 (1971). Professor Bittker has summarized the
dilemma as follows:
From 1948 to 1969, the tax differential between single and married taxpayers
imposed a "penalty" on being single. In 1969, the penalty was reduced for some
single taxpayers and eliminated for others, but this reform had a price-either
a penalty on some married couples or abandonment of the 1948 principle of
imposing equal taxes on equal-income couples. Given this choice, Congress pre-
ferred the marriage penalty.
Bittker, supra note 7, at 143 1 (footnotes omitted).
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Code Sections 71 and 215 permit former spouses to divide aggregate
taxable income into two separate taxable incomes that are not widely
disparate. Divorce will enable the former spouses to qualify for the
more favorable "single taxpayer" rates and may further (if there are
children) cause the custodial spouse to qualify for the even more fa-
vorable head-of-household rates. Furthermore, divorce will often en-
able former spouses to obtain increased standard deductions or their
equivalent, and to qualify for other deductions not previously avail-
able.17
The mechanism for decreasing the aggregate tax burden of di-
vorced persons is provided principally (but not exclusively) by Sec-
tions 71 and 215. "Periodic payments" made by a husband to a wife
are deductible by the husband and are income to the wife under Sec-
tions 215 and 7118 unless the payments are specifically designated as
17. Assume, for example, that husband and wife are married through the 1974
calendar year. The husband's gross income is $30.000 and the wife's gross income is
$20,000. Their aggregate adjusted gross income is $50,000. They have two children
and incur $4.800 in child care expenses to enable both spouses to be gainfully em-
ployed, but because their adjusted gross income exceeds $44.600 no child care ex-
penses can be deducted Linder I.R.C. § 214. They claim one standard deduction. Tax
is computed as follows:
Adjusted Gross Income ........ .......................... $50,000
Standard Deduction (1974) ........ ......................... (2,000)
Exemptions .......... ................................. (3,000)
Taxable Income ......... ............................... $45,000
Tax before Credits (I.R.C. § l(a)) ...... ..................... $14.560
Assume instead that the husband and wife were divorced in 1974 and that the hus-
band pays $8,000 to the wife as alimony, deductible by the husband under I.R.C. §
215 and income to the wife under I.R.C. § 71. Assuming that the husband has no
itemized deductions other than the alimony deduction, taxes are as follows:
Wife Husband
Gross Income ........ ........................... $28.000 $30.000
Deductions (child care deduction
and 3 exemptions for W; ali-
mony deduction and one exemp-
tion for H) ........ .......................... (7,050) (8,750)
Taxable Income ....... ......................... $20,950 $21,250
Tax before Credits (I.R.C. § l(b).(c)) ................ $ 5.132 $ 5.705
Aggregate tax is thus reduced from $14,560 to $10,837. and the computations do not
take into account other itemized deductions that each taxpayer could take in lieu of
the standard deduction.
Whether divorce is costly in tax terms depends upon the figures involved. Tax bene-
fits of a divorce will be greatest where post-dissolution incomes are relatively equal.
where parties may "double" personal deductions, where one parent may claim a child
care deduction that would not have been available to the married couple, and where
benefits accrue in terms of head-of-household and single taxpayer. As these factors are
eliminated, tax benefits are reduced.
18. I.R.C. § 71(a)(1) applies to payments incident to a "'decree of divorce or
separate maintenance." This provision, and the corollary deduction section. were
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child support payments. 19 Payments must be "periodic." Accordingly,
payment of alimony "in gross" 20 or of a lump sum 21 is not deductible.
But the deduction-inclusion rules do apply to installment payments
on a lump sum if the payments are to be made over a period of more
than ten years from the date of the decree, instrument, or agreement,
subject to the provisions of Section 7 1(c)(2). 22
It must be remembered that periodic payments do not fit within the
deduction-inclusion rules if the payments are made for a vested prop-
erty interest of the former wife.23 Moreover, periodic payments may
fail to qualify under the deduction-inclusion rules even if they are paid
for something other than a property interest, if they are in the nature
of something other than support payments.24 Consequently, before
adopted as § 120(a)-(c) of the Revenue Act of 1942 and incorporated as §§ 22(k)
and 23(u) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939. The provisions were a congres-
sional response to the Supreme Court's decision in Gould v. Gould, 245 U.S. 151
(1917), holding that alimony is not income to the wife and is not deductible by the
husband. One must assume that, to the extent the Gould case is not specifically re-
versed by legislation, it applies as a residual rule, i.e., if payments to a wife are not
specifically included as income to her in the statute they will not be so taxed. See,
e.g., Rev. Rul. 73-392, 1973-2 CuM. BULL. 18; Gordon D. Oxford, 32 CCH Tax Ct.
Mem. 1321 (1973); William M. Hardy, 59 T.C. 857 (1973). I.R.C. § 71(a)(2) &
(a)(3) was added when the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 was adopted. I.R.C. §
71(a)(2) covers amounts paid "pursuant to a written separation agreement executed
after August 16, 1954." Treas. Reg. § 1.71-1(b)(2) (1957). I.R.C. § 71(a)(3) ap-
plies to judicial support decrees issued when spouses are not yet divorced and en-
tered after March I, 1954. It should be remembered that payments are never within
the scope of I.R.C. §§ 71 & 215 unless made pursuant to a binding decree or writ-
ten agreement. Sylvia Taylor, 55 T.C. 1134 (1971). Subsections 71(a)(2) & (3) re-
quire that the wife be living separate and apart from the husband, but that fact
need not be recited in the agreement or decree. Rev. Rul. 73-409, 1973-2 CuM. BULL.
19.
19. I.R.C. § 71(b); Commissioner v. Lester, 366 U.S. 299 (1961). See text ac-
companying notes 49-51 infra. •
20. I.R.C. § 71(c); Gordon D. Oxford, 32 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1321 (1973).
21. See, e.g., William M. Hardy, 59 T.C. 857 (1973) (husband who agreed to pay
alimony until former wife's remarriage, and to then pay her a lump sum of $5,000,
could not deduct the $5,000 payment); Rev. Rul. 73-392, 1973-2 CuM. BULL. 18.
22. See note 96 and accompanying text infra. Payments on a "lump sum" are
"periodic" even if they are to be paid over a period of less than ten years if the obli-
gation to pay terminates on the occurrence of some contingency, e.g., wife's remarri-
age or death. The reason is that there is no specified lump sum. The result follows
even if the condition operates by reason of local law rather than by express provision
in the decree. Treas. Reg. § h71-1(d)(3)(ii) (1957); Baker v. Commissioner, 205
F.2d 369 (2d Cir. 1953). In Washington the obligation to pay alimony terminates on
the death of either party or upon the remarriage of the recipient, and child support
terminates upon the death of the parent obligated to support the child or emancipation
of the child "unless otherwise agreed in writing or expressly provided in the decree."
WASH. REV. CODE § 26.09.170 (1974). See also George Kent, 61 T.C. 133 (1973);
Rev. Rul. 72-133, 1972-1 CuM. BULL. 25.
23. Treas. Reg. § 1.7 1-1(c)(4) (1957).
24. See discussion in Part I infra.
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examining the details of Sections 215 and 71 and their progeny, it is
necessary to determine whether periodic payments are for "support"
or for "property."
I. DISTINGUISHING DEDUCTIBLE SUPPORT PAYMENTS
FROM NONDEDUCTIBLE PURCHASES OF PROPERTY
A. The Uncertain Scope of Section 71(c)
Section 71(c) provides that installment payments on a specified
principal sum are "periodic" only if the payments are to be paid or
may be paid over a period ending more than ten years from the date
of the decree, instrument, or agreement. If that condition is met, pay-
ments to the wife in a given taxable year may be deducted in an
amount up to ten percent of the principal sum. The condition does not
apply if payments terminate on the death or remarriage of the wife
because in such a case there is no ascertainable lump sum. 25 But the
provision does not give a husband an opportunity to purchase a prop-
erty interest of the wife on a deductible basis. The Regulations pro-
vide that "Section 71 . . .does not apply to that part of any periodic
payment attributable to that portion of any interest in property...
25. See note 22 supra. See also Baker v. Commissioner, 205 F.2d 369 (2d Cir.
1953) (monthly payments for a specified period or until wife died deductible even
though period was less than ten years); Rev. Rul. 59-190, 1959-1 CuM. BULL. 23
(payments to be made over period of less than ten years deductible by husband and
income to wife where, under local law, obligation to pay terminates on wife's death
or remarriage even if no provision to that effect is in the agreement or decree).
It is now possible in Washington to provide for periodic payments which survive
the death of the husband. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.09.170 (1974). The payments to
the wife would be income to her. They probably could not be deducted by the hus-
band's estate for income tax purposes because I.R.C. § 215 grants a deduction only
to the "husband." It is not clear whether such payments could be deducted for estate
tax purposes. Under I.R.C. § 2053(c), deductions based upon a contract are allow-
able only if supported by full and adequate consideration in money or money's worth.
For estate tax purposes, a release of marital obligations does not qualify as such full
consideration. Commissioner v. Wemyss. 324 U.S. 303 (1945); Merril v. Fahs.
324 U.S. 308 (1945)(gift tax). When a wife's claim is not based on a contract, but
is based upon a court decree, it can be argued that an estate tax deduction should be
allowable. McMurtry v. Commissioner. 203 F.2d 659 (1st Cir. 1953). Therefore, if
the wife's claim is based on an agreement not incorporated into the decree, the claim
is not deductible. If the claim is based upon a decree which has incorporated a separa-
tion contract giving rise to such a claim, it is possible that it is not deductible because
the court must incorporate the agreement unless it was "unfair at the time of its exe-
cution." WASH. REV. CODE § 26.09.070(3) (1974). See Rev. Rul. 75-395. 1975-37
INT. REV. BULl. 12.
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which . . . originally belonged to the wife."'26 Thus if a former hus-
band purchases a property interest of a former wife (such as the wife's
interest in community property or separate property of the former
wife), Sections 71 and 215 do not apply even if the payments are
made over a period more than ten years or are "periodic" because
they terminate on the occurrence of a stated contingency. 27 The wife
may realize gain; the husband may adjust basis to reflect cost; the wife
may have imputed interest under Section 48328 and the husband may
have a corresponding deduction under Section 163;29 but Sections 71
and 215 will not apply.
Some courts have adopted the restrictive view that Section 7 1(c)(2)
cannot apply unless payments are in the nature of "alimony or an al-
lowance for support." Under this view Section 7 1(c) payments are not
deductible even if made for something other than a vested property
interest of the wife. Numerous cases raise the issue: payments for equi-
table claims to property that arose by virtue of the wife's efforts but
that are not "property" under state law; 30 payments made because of
26. Treas. Reg. § 1.7 1-1(c)(4) (1957).
27. See, e.g., Ben C. Land, 61 T.C. 675 (1974); John Sidney Thompson, 22
T.C. 275 (1954), acquiesced in sub. nom., Corinne Pope Thompson, 1954-2 CUM. BULL 6.
Some of the difficulties involved in valuing community property for this purpose are
illustrated in A.J. Roberts, 33 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 750 (1974), in which certain pay-
ments were designated as payments for the purchase of the wife's community property
interest and other payments were labeled "alimony." The husband deducted all pay-
ments on the grounds that the wife actually received one-half the value of the com-
munity property in the year of divorce. The husband was successful. If payments for
property are to terminate on the former wife's death, the private annuity rules set
forth in Rev. Rul. 69-74, 1969-1 CuM. BULL. 43, could apply. The former wife
could, of course, argue that she should not be taxed until she recovers her basis. Com-
missioner v. Kann's Estate, 174 F.2d 357 (3d Cir. 1949).
28. But if payments by a husband are nondeductible because they are install-
ments on a sum certain payable within a period of less than ten years (see I.R.C. §
71(c)(1)), and not because they reflect a purchase of property, the imputed interest
rules of I.R.C. § 483 have been held to be inapplicable. Fox v. United States, 510
F.2d 1330 (3d Cir. 1975). See note 121 infra.
29. See Gerlach v. United States, 74-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9425 (Ct. Cl. 1973)
(husband entitled to deduction for imputed interest on payments made for wife's in-
terest in property).
30. See, e.g., McCombs v. Commissioner, 397 F.2d 4 (10th Cir. 1968). Husband
and wife worked together to build a profitable business. Despite the wife's efforts, the
business was the property of the husband under local law. The divorce court awarded
half the business to the wife and the husband agreed to pay for the wife's half over a
twelve-year period. Payments made by the husband were not deductible by the hus-
band under I.R.C. § 71(c)(2). The form of the transaction might make a differ-
ence to some courts. Thus if property is first awarded to the wife and the husband
then buys it, it seems clearer that I.R.C. § 71(c)(2) should not apply. But if she is
awarded no property (and never had any under local law) and instead receives the
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personal feelings or to make it easier to obtain a divorce; 31 payments
for the release of claims arising out of dower or similar "inchoate"
rights; and payments to obtain a release against pension and similar
rights that are not "property" for tax purposes. The problem arises
whenever the wife is being paid "periodically" if the payments are for
something more than her support but are for something less than a
vested "property" interest.
B. Dower and Similar Inchoate Rights
The prevailing attitude appears to be that Section 72(c)(2) pay-
ments made for the release of inchoate dower claims and similar
rights are not deductible by the husband even if they are periodic. In
Bernatschke v. United States32 the husband used approximately one-
third of his total assets to purchase several annuities for his former
wife. The annuities paid $25,000 per year. The payments were held to
be "periodic" but were not income to the wife because they arose out
of a "property settlement" in which the former wife's inchoate in-
terests under Illinois law were extinguished. This case might be distin-
guished from cases where the husband is actually making periodic pay-
ments because the former wife was the taxpayer before the court, and
a very substantial part of each payment received by her was principal
for which the husband could get no deduction. Although her receipts
were periodic (and thus potential income under Section 71(d)), the
husband's original payments were a lump sum. In spite of these dis-
tinctions, the principle of the case was adopted in Waller v. United
States,3 3 in which the husband agreed to pay the former wife a total of
right to payments over a twelve.year period. I.R.C. § 71(c)(2) might apply. See
Hayutin v. Commissioner, 508 F.2d 462 (10th Cir. 1974). The court in McCombs
may well have been influenced by the fact that the wife made a definite contribution
to family wealth which she might have recovered even if the parties had not been
married.
31. See Marion R. Hesse, 60 T.C. 685 (1973). aff'd mem., 511 F.2d 1393 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 96 S.Ct. 58 (1975), acquiesced in, 1974-2 CuM. BULL. 3 (deduc-
tion allowed).
32. 364 F.2d 400 (Ct. Cl. 1966). It is interesting to speculate where the decision
left the former husband. Presumably, the wife is considered the purchaser of the an-
nuity and should be taxed as an annuitant under I.R.C. § 72. The husband should
not be taxed. See I.R.C. § 7 1(d).
33. 75-IU.S. TaxCas. 9180(W.D. Ky. 1974).
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$55,100 over a period of more than ten years to compensate her for
her dower interest. Payments were to be made as follows:
1970 $29,000
1971-1975 5,000 per year
1976-1980 200 per year
1981 100
The husband attempted to deduct $5,000 in 1970 (about ten percent
of the total payments to be made, as authorized in Section 71(c)(2)),
but the deduction was disallowed on the grounds that even though the
payments met the literal requirements of Section 71(c)(2), they were
not in the nature of an allowance for alimony or support; rather, they
were designed to compensate the wife for her dower interest. Although
this case, too, might be distinguishable on the grounds that the de
minimis payments to be made in 1976-1981 should be disregarded
with the result that the "ten year" rule of Section 71(c)(2) was not
met, this restrictive interpretation of Section 71 (c)(2) was adopted and
summarized in McCombs v. Commissioner:34
For income tax purposes, Section 71 is directed toward periodic
payments made . . as alimony or support money. The prerequisite
of alimony or support also applies to the provisions of Section
71(c) [2] for treating installments on a principal sum which may
be paid over more than 10 years as periodic payments.
Again, this broad statement may not have been necessary to the
holding of the case. In McCombs the wife worked actively in the de-
velopment of a family business and might have had a claim even if the
parties had never been married.
Other courts seem content to hold that payments meeting the re-
quirements of Section 71 (c)(2) will qualify for the deduction-inclusion
rules of Sections 71 and 215 so long as the payments are not for a
vested property interest of the wife. In Hayutin v. Commissioner35 the
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that $500 out of each
$700 monthly payment was deductible by the husband and income to
the wife. The remaining $200 was held to represent a purchase by the
husband of a vested property interest of the wife. In response to a con-
34. 397 F.2d 4, 7 (10th Cir. 1968) (emphasis added).
35. 508 F.2d 462 (10th Cir. 1974).
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tention that Sections 71 and 215 did not apply at all because the en-
tire amount of each payment represented a "property settlement," the
court stated: "A husband's property, in Colorado, is basically free
from any vested interest of the wife, except her inchoate rights which
vest upon filing of the divorce action." 36 The court concluded that
because the wife had no vested interest in the property during the
marriage, i.e., there was no element of co-ownership during that time,
the payments were made to satisfy a marital obligation, not as part of
a division of marital property. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit also appears to assume that if community property is equally
divided, payments are of necessity in the "nature of alimony" unless
the payments are for the separate property of the wife.37
On balance, it is not safe to assume that any payments qualify for
the deduction-inclusion rules of Sections 71 and 215 unless they are in
the nature of alimony or an allowance for support. 38 If such payments
36. Id. at 469. The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, interpreting Colorado
law, has ruled that a wife's claims against her husband's property become a vested
property right when the wife files a divorce action, with the result that a "division"
of the property is not a taxable event. Imel v. United States, 523 F.2d 853 (10th Cir.
1975). Taxpayers in the Tenth Circuit are in a unique position. Installment pur-
chases of "property" can be income to the wife and deductible by the husband. In
other circuits installment payments for assets that are not "property" fall outside the
deduction-inclusion rules unless the payments are an allowance in the nature of ali-
mony or support.
37. See, e.g., Riddell v. Guggenheim, 281 F.2d 836 (9th Cir. 1960). After finding
that the wife received at least one-half the community property at the time of
divorce, the court stated that "if ... the wife relinquished no separate property in re-
turn for the monthly payments, it follows that she gave up nothing in the agreement
and the payments could only be in discharge of the marital obligation . I... "d. at
841. See also Nancy Cole Miller, 32 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 570 (1973) (periodic pay-
ments for wife's interest in joint property deductible by husband and income to wife
because she did not "contribute" to the cost); A.J. Roberts, 33 CCH Tax Ct. Mem.
750 (1974) (payments designated as "property division and not support or alimony"
nevertheless income to wife and deductible by husband because the wife has re-
ceived her full share of the community property at the time of the divorce). The
cases appear to attempt to achieve a kind of parity between common law property
states and community property states in this area. That is, if the installment pay-
ments in a common law property state are for an interest that is a substitute for a
property interest a similarly situated wife would have in a community property state,
some courts hold installment payments made in return for that interest to be outside
the scope of I.R.C. §§ 71 and 215. Where payments are for neither a property in-
terest nor an interest in the nature of dower, § 7 1(c)(2) payments are income to the
wife and deductible by the husband even if they are not in the nature of "support"
payments. See Marion R. Hesse, 60 T.C. 685 (1973), aff'd mem., 511 F.2d 1393
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 96 S.Ct. 58 (1975), acquiesced in, 1974-2 CuM. BULL. 3.
38. A rule that payments otherwise "periodic" are subject to the deduction-
inclusion rules unless the payments reflect the purchase of vested property rights
would be preferable to the existing uncertainty. A large part of the current confu-
sion may be attributable to the following statement in the House Ways and Means
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do not represent installments on a purchase of a vested property in-
terest and are not in the nature of alimony or an allowance for sup-
port, it is possible that the payor would get no deduction under Sec-
tion 215, could not adjust his basis in the property, and would get no
deduction for imputed interest. The payee, on the other hand, would
have no income of any kind. She would be better off than one who
sells a vested property interest because the latter might recognize gain
and realize imputed interest under Section 483. The decisions in the
McCombs, Waller, and Bernatschke cases make Section 71(c)(2) a
trap for the unwary. Section 71(c)(2) can literally apply only to pay-
ments which survive the death or remarriage of either spouse. If the
payments terminate upon the death or remarriage of either spouse,
there is no payment of an ascertainable principal lump sum and the
limitations of Section 7 1(c) do not apply. If the payments do survive
the death of the payee, it is difficult to sustain the argument that they
are in the nature of "support" or "alimony." It is accordingly difficult
to imagine any Section 71(c)(2) payment that is not subject to attack
by the Commissioner.39
Attorneys and their clients would certainly feel more secure if they
could plan divorce settlements on the safe assumption that the deduc-
tion-inclusion rules apply to all periodic payments other than pay-
ments for a vested property interest of a recipient spouse. Regrettably,
they cannot make such assumptions with certainty. It would therefore
seem advisable, in any case where periodic payments meet the literal
requirements of Section 71 and are not designed to purchase a prop-
erty interest of the payee spouse, to include a provision in the separa-
tion contract under which the payee agrees to hold the payor harmless
from tax liability in the event that the payor is unable to deduct such
payments.
Committee report accompanying the predecessor of I.R.C. §§ 71 & 215: "[The provi-
sions apply only to payments made] in recognition of the general obligation to sup-
port .... H.R. REP. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942), in I SEIDMAN'S LEGIS-
LATIVE HISTORY OF FEDERAL INCOME AND ExcEss PROFITS TAX LAWS 1953-1939, at
1277-78 (1954). However, the Senate Finance Committee amended the original
House bill to include § 72(c)(2) installment payments and should therefore modify
the House statement that the provisions cover only "support" payments. S. REP. No.
1631. 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942), in t SEIDMAN, supra, at 1279-80.
39. For example, if a wife "sells" her dower or similar inchoate rights to a hus-
band who wants a divorce, she could sell that interest for a private annuity payable
by the husband and terminating on her death. Under the Bernatschke case, the de-
duction-inclusion rules of §§ 71 & 215 would not apply.
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C. Assignment of Income Problems
1. Vested rights to receive income
In community property states the assets of a divorcing couple may
include rights to receive income which accrued during coverture, but
which will not be collected or reported for tax purposes until after the
marital community is dissolved. These items might include accounts
receivable of cash basis taxpayers, unrealized receivables arising from
installment sales reported under the installment method of accounting
under Section 453, and vested pension rights. To the extent these
items were realized during the existence of the marital community,
they will eventually be taxed one-half to each spouse regardless of
who in fact collects the income, in accordance with the Supreme
Court's decision in Poe v. Seaborn.40 If these items are partitioned
equally, the partition is not a taxable event and each spouse reports
his or her share of income as it is collected. But where partition is not
feasible, one spouse may receive the assets and agree to pay the other
spouse for his or her share as the assets are collected or at some other
time. These arrangements do not fall within the deduction-inclusion
rules of Sections 71 and 215, but the tax results are similar. The ini-
tial settlement should not be a taxable event if the payee receives only
the payor's unsecured promise to pay. 41 The arrangement should be
treated as an open transaction and the payee should report income
only as she is paid by the husband.42 The husband should not deduct
the payments as such, but should increase his basis in the underlying
assets, thereby reducing his income on collection. 43
The preceding statements are only generalizations. As to accounts
receivable of cash basis taxpayers, the generalizations should apply if
the wife receives payments more or less contemporaneously with the
husband's collection of the accounts receivable. As to vested pension
40. 282 U.S. 101 (1930). See also United States v. Mitchell, 403 U.S. 190 (1971)
(Louisiana widow held liable for tax on half the income earned by her deceased hus-
band even though she renounced any claim to such income).
41. See Helvering v. Eubank, 311 U.S. 122 (1940).
42. The theory is that the payor's unsecured promise to pay has no market value.
Rev. Rul. 69-47 1, 1969-2 CUM. BULL. 10. Cf. C.W. Titus. 33 B.T.A. 928 (1936). On
the other hand, where a wife received her husband's note "in payment for" her in-
terest in accounts receivable, she was held to have realized income in the year of
sale. Royce Showalter, 33 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 192 (1974).
43. See Johnson v. United States, 135 F.2d 125, 130 (9th Cir. 1943).
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rights, the Internal Revenue Service has ruled that the wife should
report payments made to her by the husband under assignment of
income principles (rather than under Section 71) 4 4 but has not ruled
on the issue of whether the husband may exclude from income the
amounts he pays to his former wife. The surrender of rights to receive
payments under an installment obligation governed by Section 453
presents a more difficult problem. Section 453 indicates that a transfer
of an interest in such an obligation is a taxable event,45 whether or not
the consideration received can be valued *at the time of transfer.
Rights under such installment contracts should be partitioned if the
taxpayers wish to avoid immediate recognition of gain, notwith-
standing a 1949 case indicating that transfers of such obligations in
equal divisions of community property are not taxable events.46
2. Unvested rights to receive income
Nothing reflects the unsatisfactory state of the law in this area more
than the disposition of unvested or partially vested rights to receive
future income. Pension rights, whether vested, unvested, or partially
vested, are clearly assets that divorce courts should take into account
in determining what payments are to be made to the wife.47 If peri-
odic payments are made to compensate a wife for an "inchoate" in-
terest in a husband's pension rights in a common law property state, it
is exceedingly difficult to say that she is being paid for a "property"
44. Rev. Rul. 69-471, 1969-2 CuM. BULL. 10 (military retirement pay held to be
community property; wife gave up her claim to one-half of pension of $30 per
month for life of husband in return for payment by husband to her of $30 per
month for 36 months; held not to be covered by I.R.C. §§ 71 & 215 but that under
assignment of income principles the amounts paid to the wife by the husband were
her income in the years received).
45. I.R.C. § 453(d).
46. Ann Y. Oliver, 8 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 403,430 (1949).
47. See Payne v. Payne, 82 Wn. 2d 573, 512 P.2d 736 (1973), discussed in Note,
Disposition of Military Retired Pay Upon Dissolution of Marriage, 50 WASH. L.
REV. 505 (1975). Pension rights can obviously be unvested, partially vested, or to-
tally vested at the time of divorce. See I.R.C. §§ 401-415. Even if totally vested,
the eventual pension may be increased by reason of continued post-divorce employment.
The Washington court has taken unvested pension rights into account in the property
division pursuant to a marriage dissolution to the extent of the community's contri-
bution. Wilder v. Wilder, 85 Wn. 2d 362, 534 P.2d 1355 (1975)(pension right con-
tingent upon husband's reenlistment in the Navy for one year or less, court to con-
sider length of time before eligibility would mature and other options available to




interest, because the pension right, whether or not vested, is not
"property" for general income tax purposes. The Bernatschke, Waller,
and McCombs decisions nevertheless make it unwise to assume that
periodic payments made in return for the wife's inchoate interest in
such items will be governed by the deduction-inclusion rules of Sec-
tions 71 and 215. The problem cannot be avoided in community
property states because, to the extent a pension is unvested at time of
divorce, it is not clear, for federal tax purposes, that it can be said to
be earned during coverture and therefore partially taxable to the wife
regardless of who collects the pension. To the extent that it was not
vested during coverture, payments for the wife's interest might also be
subject to the rules set forth in Bernatschke, Waller, and McCombs.
Because of existing uncertainty, the parties should arrive at an agree-
ment as to how the periodic payments made in return for the sur-
render of absolute or inchoate rights in future pensions (whether
vested or not) should be taxed. Thus, if a husband agrees (or is re-
quired by decree) to pay a former wife $1,000 per year for twelve
years in return for her release of any claims to any future pension
rights of the husband, the agreement or decree should set forth the
intention that the amounts paid to the wife will be taxed to her and
not to the husband (either under assignment of income principles or
under Sections 71 and 215). The agreement or decree should further
provide that the wife will hold the husband harmless against taxes to
be paid by him in the event the intentions of the parties are not real-
ized.48
II. ALIMONY AND CHILD SUPPORT-CONSEQUENCES
OF CATEGORIZATION
A. The Lester Case
To the extent payments are "in the nature of an allowance for ali-
mony or support," both the Code and the courts provide maximum
48. Usually parties can avoid serious problems if they realize that one spouse is
paying the other spouse for the latter's right to income. If Ann Y. Oliver, 8 CCH Tax
Ct. Mem. 403 (1949), is still good law, a transfer of rights under I.R.C. § 453 in-
stallment obligations is not, per se, a taxable event. Accordingly, if a wife transfers a
right to income earned during marriage in return for installment payments to be made
by the husband (but is not then taxed), she can report the income from the transfer
as amounts are collected from the husband under the "open transaction" doctrine.
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flexibility in determining which spouse should be taxed on the income.
The deduction-inclusion rules of Sections 71 and 215 do not apply to
"that part of any payment which the terms of the decree, instrument,
or agreement fix, in terms of an amount of money or a part of the
payment, as a sum which is payable for the support of minor children
of the husband. '49 But according to the Supreme Court's decision in
Commissioner v. Lester,50 the part of the payment attributable to
child support must be set forth specifically, and cannot be inferred
from the underlying facts and circumstances. For example, if a decree
orders a father with two minor children to pay the custodial mother
$600 per month, reducible by $200 per month as each child becomes
21, and further reducible by $200 per month when and if the mother
remarries, it might reasonably be inferred that $400 of each payment
is intended to serve as child support. But under Lester the inference is
not permissible unless the decree or agreement specifically fixes the
amount of child support. In the example just given, the wife would
include as income and the husband would deduct the full amount of
each monthly payment. 5'
At the time the Lester case was decided, it was commonly assumed
that taxes could be lowered by agreements or decrees similar to the
decree in Lester as long as the former husband could be expected to
be in a higher tax bracket than the former wife. The assumption was
generally correct at the time because (1) the standard deduction was
See Rev. Rul. 69-471, 1969-2 CuM. BULL. 10. The Oliver case does not inspire con-
fidence, however, as it did not mention the problem created by I.R.C. § 453 and is
thus of doubtful validity as a precedent. If the wife receives for her right a promissory
note that has market value she might recognize gain upon receipt of the note. Royce
Showalter, 33 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 192 (1974). A transfer of a mere right to income
cannot qualify for the installment method of reporting under I.R.C. § 453. See
Realty Loan Corp., 54 T.C. 1083 (1970), aff'd, 478 F.2d 1049 (9th Cir. 1973);
Charles Sorensen, 22 T.C. 321, 342 (1954).
49. I.R.C. § 7 1(b).
50. 366 U.S. 299 (1961).
51. See, e.g., Betty Lou Nelson, 32 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 356 (1973) (payment of
$475 per month, reducible by $137.50 per month when each of two minor children
becomes emancipated and by another $200 per month when the wife remarries, all
income to the wife under I.R.C. § 71(a)). Sloppiness should nevertheless be avoided.
A requirement of "alimony for the support of the children" would be treated as
child support. Cleveland J. Harris, 51 T.C. 980 (1969). Similarly, if a husband makes
periodic payments to a wife who "undertakes to expend" a specified amount for
child support, a portion of each payment will be nondeductible child support. West
v. United States, 413 F.2d 294 (4th Cir. 1969). A similar problem was presented in
Commissioner v. Gotthelf, 407 F.2d 491 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 828 (1969),
in which the husband was to pay the wife $12,000 per year reducible by $5,000 per
year on the wife's remarriage and by $3,500 per year upon the emancipation of each
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then a relatively insignificant deduction; 52 (2) the custodial parent
would be likely to claim the children as her dependents in any event;53
and (3) the child care deduction was much less significant than it is
now.54 Because all of these factors have now changed, it is dangerous
to assume that payment of alimony as opposed to "specifically desig-
nated child support" saves taxes.
B. Ancillary Considerations
1. Standard deduction
It should first be remembered that the deduction granted for ali-
mony payments is a deduction from adjusted gross income rather than
a deduction toward adjusted gross income.5 5 As a consequence, the
of two children. The agreement also provided that if the husband should die, his es-
tate should be bound to pay $7,000 per year "for the benefit of the two children, as in
this agreement provided for." The court held that the necessary specificity was present
and that $7,000 of each $12,000 payment was nondeductible child support. It is prob-
able that if the quoted statement had been deleted from the agreement, the entire
amount would have been treated as alimony. Thus in states where alimony autonat-
ically terminates on the payor's death, the income splitting potential of the Lester
case is diminished. The problem could be alleviated by avoiding any requirement of
post-death payments, substituting therefor sufficient insurance (in the wife's name) to
cover support of the wife and children after the payor's death.
52. 1 S. SURREY, W. WARREN, P. McDANIEL & H. AULT, FEDERAL INCOME TAXA-
TION 550-54 (1972), wherein the authors review the history of the standard deduc-
tions, states:
With the standard deduction, the taxpayer can choose a blanket fixed amount-
prior to 1969, 10% of adjusted gross income up to a maximum of $1,000 ($500
if a separate return were filed by a married person)-or can itemize and claim
separately each allowable personal expense. In addition, the Revenue Act of
1964 established a minimum standard deduction equal to $200 ($100 for a
married person filing separately) plus $100 for each personal exemption allowed
under section 15 1.
Id. at 550.
53. See note 65 and accompanying text infra.
54. See note 66 and accompanying text infra.
55. The deduction authorized by I.R.C. § 215 is not listed as a deduction allow-
able in computing adjusted gross income. See I.R.C. § 62. In discussing the predeces-
sors of I.R.C. 88 71 & 215, Representative Disney stated:
The amount of a husband's income which goes to the wife as alimony . . .
is in reality not income to him at all since he has no control over it as the use
to which it is to be put. The bill recognizes this reality by permitting the hus-
band to deduct so much of his income as is paid out in alimony, and by taxing
the alimony payments to the wife.
88 CONG. REC. 6377 (1942), in I SEIDMAN'S LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF FEDERAL INCOME
AND EXCESS PROFITS TAX LAWS 1953-1939, at 1280 (1954). If alimony is not the
husband's income to begin with, it should at least be deductible from gross income in
computing adjusted gross income under I.R.C. § 62. The view that an alimony pay-
ment is an item of "consumption" deductible only as a matter of legislative grace
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deduction may be taken only in lieu of,5 6 not in addition to, the stan-
dard deduction. 57 Prior to the adoption of the Tax Reduction Act of
1975, the standard deduction was fifteen percent of adjusted gross in-
come with a maximum deduction of $2,000 and a minimum deduc-
tion (low income allowance) of $1,300.58 Under Section 201 of the
Tax Reduction Act of 1975, the standard deduction is now sixteen
percent of adjusted gross income for an unmarried individual with a
maximum deduction of $2,300 and a minimum deduction (low in-
come allowance) of $1,600. The alimony-paying husband whose item-
ized deductions, other than for alimony, exceed the amount of the
standard deduction derives full tax benefit from each dollar of ali-
mony paid, diluted only by the loss of dependency exemption allow-
ances for the children. But a former husband whose itemized deduc-
tions are small may derive minimal or no tax benefit from the Section
215 deduction, even though the entire payment will be taxed as in-
come to the wife, because that deduction deprives him of the standard
deduction and also generally deprives him of exemption allowances
for the children.
2. Exemption allowances
Prior to 1967, the designation of payments as alimony or as child
support may have had an influence on which parent was entitled to
the dependency exemption allowances for the children of the broken
marriage, but such designation certainly did not settle the question.59
The parent who in fact provided over half the support of the child or
children was entitled to the exemption allowance, regardless of any
seems to have carried the day. If the "reality" recognized by Representative Disney
were recognized in the Code, the § 215 deduction should be one of the deductions
listed in I.R.C. § 62.
56. See notes 66-73 infra.
57. id.
58. I.R.C. §§ 141-144. The increases in the low income allowance, standard de-
duction, and maximum standard deduction, as well as the $30 credit for personal and
dependency exemptions, are stated to be temporary. Tax Reduction Act of 1975, Pub.
L. No. 94-12, § 209, 89 Stat. 35 (now codified as I.R.C. § 42). They were extended
into the first six months of 1976 by the Revenue Adjustment Act of 1975, Pub. L. No.
94-164, 89 Stat. 970.
59. In fact, the custodial parent was likely to be permitted to take the exemption
allowance. See Logomarcino, The Divorced Husband and the Dependency Exemption
Mirage: An Outline of the Problem and of a Statutory Corrective Procedure, 12
TAx L. REV. 85 (1956).
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provision in the decree, instrument, or agreement. If neither provided
over half of the support, neither would obtain the exemption allow-
ance even if together they provided over half of the support. For tax-
able years beginning after December 31, 1966, however, Section
15 2(e) now provides generally that if the former spouses together pro-
vide over half the support of a child or children, one of the parents will
get the exemption or exemptions.60 Thus, if a grandparent, a father,
and a mother each provide one-third of a child's support, one of the
two divorced parents will get the deduction even though neither pro-
vides over half the support of the child. 61 If this condition (i.e., that
the parents together provide over half the support) is met, the cus-
todial parent is deemed to provide over half the support of the child
unless certain other conditions apply. Those conditions are: (1) if the
decree, instrument, or agreement awards the dependency exemption
for a child to the noncustodial parent and he pays at least $600 per
year in designated child support for that child, the noncustodial
parent gets the exemption; and (2) if the decree, instrument, or agree-
ment is silent but the noncustodial parent pays at least $1,200 in child
support, he is presumed to pay more than the custodial parent (and
thus get the exemptions), unless the custodial parent "clearly estab-
lish [es]" that she paid more than the noncustodial parent. 62
60. If a third party (e.g., grandparent) provides over half the support of a child.
I.R.C. § 152(e) does not apply and neither parent can claim the exemption. Harvey
Hopkins, 55 T.C. 538 (1970). But if the noncustodial spouse remarries and the
amounts are paid by his new spouse or out of the community income of such parent
and his new spouse, amounts paid by the new spouse can be taken into account by
the noncustodial parent if he and his new spouse file a joint return. Martin Colton,
56 T.C. 471 (1971). See also Rev. Rul. 73-175, 1973-1 CUM. BULL. 59 (similar rule
applied to custodial parent).
61. Payments designated as alimony cannot be taken into account by the non-
custodial spouse in determining which parent provided more support. I.R.C. §
152(b)(4); Lory Buccola, 54 T.C. 1599 (1970).
62. I.R.C. § 152(e)(2). It was hoped that I.R.C. § 152(e), adopted by Act of
Aug. 31, 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-78, § l(a), 81 Stat. 191, would stem the spate of liti-
gation arising from attempts by both parents to claim dependency exemptions where
the noncustodial parent paid child support. See H.R. REP. No. 102, 90th Cong.. 1st
Sess. 2 (1967), in 1967-2 CUM. BULL. 590. The Report states that "[t] he number of
disputes involving this issue is so great that it has cast a serious administrative burden
on the Service and has tended to clog the administrative machinery involved in bring-
ing them to a conclusion." Id. at 592. Litigation has abated, but it has not ceased, es-
pecially in cases where the noncustodial parent pays more than $1,200 in total
child support but no exemptions are awarded to him in the decree, instrument, or
agreement. For example, if there are four children and the husband contributes more
than one-fourth but less than one-half of their total support, he gets no dependency
exemption deductions. Presumably the result would be different if the decree obligated
him to support only one child, but in that same amount. Stanley J. Madziarz. 30
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The exemption allowance is $750 per person.63 Under the Tax
Reduction Act of 1975, a taxpayer is also entitled to a credit of $30
for each personal and dependency exemption allowance.64 Thus, in a
case where (i) a couple has one child, (ii) the noncustodial father pays
$600 of designated child support per year, and (iii) the decree, instru-
ment, or agreement awards the exemption allowance for the child to
the father, the father would be entitled to an exemption deduction of
$750 and, in 1975, a tax credit of $30. Finally, this deduction and
this credit, unlike the deduction for alimony, may be taken in addition
to (and not merely in lieu of) the standard deduction or low income
allowance. This disparity in exemptions is mitigated somewhat by the
fact that the custodial parent can qualify for favorable head-of-house-
hold tax rates even if none of the children are her dependents as de-
fined in Section 152, as long as she provides over half the cost of
maintaining a household in which an unmarried child lives. 65
3. Child care deduction
The Revenue Act of 1971 substantially increased the significance of
the child care deduction. 66 As amended in 1971, Section 214 al-
lows a deduction of up to $400 per month for amounts spent by a
parent for the care of her or his dependent children, whether the care
is provided inside or outside the home, if the expenses are incurred to
enable the parent to be gainfully employed. As further amended in
1975, the deduction is phased out as annual adjusted gross income
CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1226 (1971). Arrearages in child support paid in a current year
cannot be counted in determining the amount of the noncustodial parent's contribu-
tion in the current year. Bobby R. Casey, 60 T.C. 68 (1973).
63. I.R.C. § 151.
64. Tax Reduction Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-12, § 203, 89 Stat. 30, amending
I.R.C. § 42. This provision is stated to be temporary. See id., § 209, 89 Stat. 35.
65. I.R.C. § 2(b). A child must be a dependent to give a custodial spouse head-of-
household status only if the child is married. I.R.C. § 2(b)(1)(A)(i). It is therefore
unnecessary and ineffective to allocate at least one dependency exemption to the cus-
todial parent if the only purpose is to give the custodial parent head-of-household
status.
66. See Hjorth, A Tax Subsidy for Child Care: Sec. 210 of the Revenue Act of
1971, 50 TAxEs 133 (1972). Those interested in examining the life and death of aca-
demic debates may wish to compare Feld, Deductibility of Expenses for Child Care
and Household Services: New Section 214, 27 TAX L. REV. 415 (1972), and Feld,
Another Word on Child Care, 28 TAX L. REV. 546 (1973), with Schaffer & Berman,
Two Cheers for the Child Care Deduction, 28 TAX L. REv. 535 (1973), and Schaffer
& Berman, The Child Care Deduction and the Progressivity of the Income Tax, A
Reply to Professor Feld, 28 TAx L. REV. 549 (1973).
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begins to exceed $35,000 per year. 67 The phase-out is accomplished
by reducing the monthly deduction otherwise available by one dollar
for each two dollars of annual adjusted gross income in excess of
$35,000. If the parents are married, their incomes are combined 68 in
determining the adjusted gross income. For example, if the married
parents of two children spend $400 per month for in-home care of
their two dependent children (both under the age of 15) in order to
enable both parents to be gainfully employed and if their combined
adjusted gross income is $35,000 or less, they may deduct $4,800 as
an itemized personal deduction on their joint return. Because the
monthly deduction is reduced by one dollar for each two dollars of
annual adjusted gross income in excess of $35,000, the deduction is
phased out completely when combined adjusted gross income equals
or exceeds $44,600. In the case of divorced parents, however, only
the income of the custodial parent is taken into account in applying
the phase-out. 69 Thus, if the parents just described were to divorce
and the post-divorce income of the custodial parent was $35,000 or
less, the phase-out would not apply. Consequently, divorce might
enable affluent taxpayers to obtain a deduction otherwise unavailable
because of the amount of their previously combined incomes.
Several additional aspects of Section 214 must be taken into ac-
count when planning post-dissolution payment arrangements: (1) the
deduction is not available if the custodial parent claims the standard
deduction;70 (2) the deduction is available only to the custodial parent
who incurs the expense in order to be able to work outside the home,
and may not be claimed by the noncustodial parent even if the chil-
dren are his dependents for tax purposes; 71 (3) the deduction is avail-
able to the custodial working parent only if the expenses are incurred
for her dependents for whom she "is entitled to a deduction [or de-
ductions] under section 15 1(e)." 72 Consequently, if the noncustodial
parent pays "child support" and is awarded the dependency exemp-
67. Tax Reduction Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-12, § 206, 89 Stat. 32, amending
I.R.C. § 214(d). Under prior law the deduction was phased out as adjusted gross in-
come began to exceed $18,000 per year.
68. I.R.C. § 214(d)(last sentence).
69. An individual legally separated from his or her spouse at the end of his or
her taxable year is not considered to be married unless a joint return is filed. I.R.C.
§ 143.
70. See I.R.C. § 62.
71. Ignacy R. Skarbek, 29 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 465 (1970).72. I.R.C. § 214(b)(l)(A).
252
Vol. 51: 233, 1976
Post-Dissolution Support Payments
tions for the children under Section 152(e), neither the custodial nor
the noncustodial parent will be able to deduct amounts spent for child
care under Section 214.
The requirement that the children involved be dependents of the
working custodial parent appears to discriminate against low-income
taxpayers who divorce. High income noncustodial fathers are likely to
have itemized personal deductions in excess of the maximum standard
deduction even before the deduction of Section 215 is taken into ac-
count.73 Thus payments to the custodial mother will not be designated
as child support. She will report the payments as alimony and claim
the children as her dependents. If she incurs child care expenses to be
gainfully employed, she may deduct those expenses subject to the limi-
tations contained in Section 214. However, low income noncustodial
fathers, inclined to take the standard deduction because of few item-
ized personal deductions, may well prefer to designate all payments as
child support payments. Such payments are not deductible as such,
but may enable the fathers to claim dependency exemption allowances
and credits which can be taken in addition to the standard deduction.
Such a scheme, if adopted, will deprive the custodial parent of an oth-
erwise available child care deduction.
4. Medical expenses
Many questions in this area are academic in the sense that the ques-
tions exist but are not of sufficient importance for courts or adminis-
trators to answer. The first question is whether an employee realizes
income under employer plans that provide insurance for the medical
expenses of the employee and his or her children if the children are
the dependents of the other spouse. This could occur if a noncustodial
father pays alimony instead of child support (thereby enabling the
custodial mother to obtain dependency exemptions under Section
73. S. REP. No. 91-552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 256 (1969) states:
[The] standard deduction [introduced in 1944] accounts for most of the returns
filed for those with adjusted gross incomes below $3,000 and still accounts for
three-fourths of the returns for adjusted gross income levels of $3,000 to $5,000
. . . . For those with incomes between $10,000 and $15,000 the standard deduc-
tion accounts for only about one-fourth of the returns filed, and above that level
it tails off quite rapidly ....
Although the standard deduction has been increased in 1969, 1971, and 1975, the




152(e)) and is covered by a plan providing health insurance for him-
self and his children. The same issue is presented if the custodial
mother receives child support payments (thereby allowing the father
to obtain the dependency exemptions under Section 152(e)) and is
similarly covered by a plan for herself and her children. The Regula-
tions under Section 106 indicate that employer contributions to such
plans are exempt to the extent health insurance is provided for the
employee, his spouse or "his dependents as defined in section 152."17
It is improbable that an employee would, as a practical matter, report
income in either of the examples presented above.
The question of whether or not a parent is entitled to a medical
expense deduction for a child appears to be more significant. An ob-
vious but often forgotten point is that a taxpayer may deduct only
medical care expenses for that care provided to the taxpayer and his
or her dependents. If the decree provides that one parent shall provide
medical insurance for the children, and that the other parent shall pay
all expenses not covered by insurance, only the parent who can claim
the children as dependents will be able to deduct any medical ex-
penses under Section 213.75 Future medical expenses are unpredict-
able, and it is almost impossible to devise a decree or agreement that
would not give rise to substantial inequity. Section 213 should be
amended to allow deductions for medical expenses paid by either
parent even if the child is the dependent of the other, with an ade-
quate provision to prevent double deductions.
C. Shortfalls and Arrearages
If a husband is obligated to pay both child support and alimony
and pays less than the total amount due in a given year, payments
actually made are applied first to child support and second to ali-
mony.76 The same rule applies to payments of arrearages. To illus-
trate: husband is required to pay $1,200 per year in child support
74. Treas. Reg. § 1.106-1 (1956).
75. I.R.C.§ 213(a).
76. I.R.C. § 71(b) (last sentence); Treas. Reg. § 1.71-1(e)(1957).
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and $1,200 per year in alimony. The dependency exemption for the
one child is awarded to the husband. The husband pays:
(i) In year one $0
(ii) In year two 1,200
(iii) In year three 6,000
In year one the wife has no income under Section 71. The husband
deducts nothing. He cannot claim a dependency exemption because
he did not pay at least $600 in child support. In year two the entire
payment is considered to be child support. The wife has no income
and the husband can claim the child as his dependent. In year three
$2,400 is deemed to be child support (even though the husband is
considered to have paid only $1,200 in year three for purposes of
Section 152(e)) and $3,600 is deemed to be alimony. The child
support arrearage payment does not enable the husband to claim a
dependency exemption retroactively for year one.77
If a husband pays child support and alimony and also makes in-
stallment payments on the purchase of a property interest of the wife,
the installment payments would presumably rank third in application,
absent an agreement to the contrary, but the issue does not appear to
have been litigated.78
III. MISCELLANEOUS ALIMONY PROBLEMS
A. Annulments and Meretricious Relationships
Sections 71 and 215 treat as alimony periodic payments made "be-
cause of the marital or family relationship. ' '79 The Internal Revenue
Service originally ruled that the sections did not apply to cases where
77. See William E. Borbonus, 42 T.C. 983 (1964), acquiesced in, 1965-2 CuM.
BULL. 4; Clarence W. Smith, 51 T.C. 1 (1968), acquiesced in, 1969-2 CuM. BULL.
xxv.
78. The order of priority of alimony payments and property purchase payments
should be set forth in the decree.
79. I.R.C. § 71(a). The statute certainly implies that a legal marriage, or the dis-
solution of a legal marriage, is a condition precedent to the application of I.R.C. §§
71 & 215. The 1954 Code applies, as did the 1939 Code, only if "a wife is divorced or
legally separated from her husband .... " I.R.C. § 71(a)(1) (emphasis added); Int.
Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 1, § 22(k), 56 Stat. 816 (virtually identical wording). One
court has stated that it will apply a federal rule in determining whether parties are,
or have been married. See Estate of Borax v. Commissioner, 349 F.2d 666 (2d Cir.
1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 935 (1966), in which payments were made to a wife
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the parties were never married under local law. 80 Two cases arising
under the former Domestic Relations Law of New York nevertheless
held that local labels do not control, but it is not clear how far these
cases go.81 Thus payments made because of a marriage that was
merely "voidable" from its inception brought Sections 71 and 215
into play upon its termination.82 One case has applied those sections
to payments following a marriage declared void from its inception. 83
It is not yet clear whether payments made to a "wife" in all cases of
termination of a void or voidable marriage fit within Sections 71 and
215.
Presumably, in states that recognize common-law marriages pay-
ments made pursuant to a dissolution could constitute alimony. It
seems unlikely that states not recognizing common-law marriages
could compel a consort to pay alimony to a former consort, 84 but the
father in a dissolved meretricious relationship can be required to pay
subsequent to a 1952 Mexican divorce. The court held that payments were "incident"
to a divorce even though the divorce was invalid under New York law. The Internal
Revenue Service has announced that it will not follow the Borax decision. Rev. Rul.
67-442, 1967-2 CuM. BULL. 65.
80. See Rev. Rul. 59-130, 1959-1 CuM. BULL. 61, which held that an annulment
granted for a spouse's incurable insanity, even though called annulment under New
York law, is within the scope of I.R.C. §§ 71 & 215 because the marriage was merely
voidable and not void from its inception. The ruling implies that payments made
pursuant to a marriage determined to be void from its inception are not within I.R.C.
§§ 71 & 215.
8 1. See notes 82 & 83 infra.
82. George F. Reisman, 49 T.C. 570 (1968), acquiesced in, 1971-2 CuM. BULL. 3.
83. Andrew M. Newburger, 61 T.C. 457 (1974), acquiesced in, 1974-2 CuM.
BULL. 3. In Newburger, the wife had been married previously and had obtained an ex
parte Nevada divorce. She then married taxpayer. A New York court found that the
Nevada divorce was invalid, that the wife had therefore never been married to the
"second husband," but that he should nevertheless pay her maintenance of $200 per
week. The court held that I.R.C. §§ 71 & 215 applied and implied that they would
apply in any case where a local court attaches sufficient "validity" to an annulled
"marriage" to require one party to pay maintenance to the other. 61 T.C. at 460.
84. But see In re Estate of Thornton, 81 Wn. 2d 72, 499 P.2d 864 (1972). On
appeal from retrial on the issue of whether a long-term (14 year) meretricious rela-
tionship would give rise to a community property interest in the acquisitions made
during the term of the relationship, Division III of the Washington Court of Appeals.
subsequent to remand, held that the relationship did not meet the elements necessary
to give rise to a property interest, i.e.: " '[E] xistence of a relatively long-term, stable
meretricious relationship in which the partners appear to hold themselves out as hus-
band and wife,"' (italics by court of appeals). In re Estate of Thornton, 14 Wn. App.
397, 402, 541 P.2d 1243, 1247 (1975), quoting 81 Wn. 2d at 75, 499 P.2d at 866.
Presumably, if these elements were present in the event of termination of such a rela-
tionship during the parties' lifetimes, there would be community property which would
have to be divided between the parties. Furthermore, if there were children of the re-
lationship, the full range of issues with regard to property settlement versus alimony
and alimony versus child support would be raised.
256
Post-Dissolution Support Payments
child support. If he is required to do so, but the agreement, instru-
ment, or decree does not specify any portion of the payment as being
for child support, payments should not be deductible under Section
215. A person does not pay "alimony" to one who was never his or
her spouse, but fathers do pay child support for illegitimate children.
Although it is not clear whether payments not specified as "child sup-
port" would be taxed to the recipient (or deductible by the payor)
under these circumstances, the payments should not, under Section
71, be income to the recipient who never would have been a spouse.
Under the general principles of Gould v. Gould,8 5 the payee would
not appear to have gross income even under Section 61 and the payor
would not be entitled to a deduction.
B. Alimony Trusts
Section 71(d) applies to "periodic payments . . .attributable to
property transferred, in trust or otherwise, in discharge of' a legal ob-
ligation imposed on the husband and arising-out of "the marital or
family relationship .... 86 When amounts payable to the wife are
attributable to transferred property, the husband does not include
such amounts in his income and may not deduct any such payments
from gross income. The Internal Revenue Service has taken the posi-
tion that Section 71 is inconsistent with Section 682 (which deals spe-
cifically with the taxation of trust distributions in the event of divorce)
and that Section 71 applies when the trust is created "incident to" a
divorce.87 It is the position of the Internal Revenue Service that Sec-
tion 682 applies only to trusts not created "incident to" the divorce,
as, for example, an antenuptial trust for the benefit of the wife where
the trust survives the divorce. The difference, in the opinion of the
Service, is that the wife's gross income in the case of a Section 71 ali-
mony trust includes the entire amount of each payment, whereas in a
Section 682 trust the wife's income is limited to the amount of of dis-
tributable net income of the trust.88 The difference is illustrated in
85. 245 U.S. 151 (1917). To the extent applicable, I.R.C. §§ 71 & 215 overruled
Gould, but for situations not covered by those sections, Gould presumably still applies.
86. I.R.C. § 71(a)(1).
87. Treas. Reg. § 1.682(a)-l(a)(2) (1957).
88. This distinction is supported by the legislative history of the predecessor of
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Ellis v. United States,89 involving a Section 71 alimony trust. The
corpus of the trust included a substantial amount of tax-exempt
bonds. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that the distri-
butions to the wife from a Section 71 alimony trust were not income
to her to the extent they represented tax-exempt interest from munic-
ipal bonds. If the trust had been a Section 682 trust, the wife's income
would not have included the tax-exempt bond interest. If the husband
simply had kept the bonds and paid over the interest to his wife, she
presumably would have had income even though the interest would
not have been taxable to the husband, and he would have obtained a
deduction for payments made. 90
Although the Internal Revenue Service is not likely to change its
position because of the decision in the Ellis case, the result in Ellis
makes a great deal of sense in many contexts. Suppose, for example,
that a husband creates an "annuity trust" incident to a divorce decree
calling for annual payments to the wife of eight percent of the initial
market value of the trust. If the corpus of the trust consists of low-
basis, high-value stocks paying small dividends, the trustee may be re-
quired to sell some of the stocks to make annual payments. In United
States v. Davis9 the court implied that the husband should bear the
burden of the tax on the gain. Four different tax consequences are
I.R.C. § 71. The House Committee Report on § 22(k) of the Internal Revenue Code
of 1939 provides in part as follows:
Where the husband's alimony or separate maintenance obligation is dis-
charged through periodic payments attributable to property in trust, life insur-
ance, annuity or endowment contracts, or to any other interest in property, the
wife is required to include such payments in gross income, whether they come
fi-om income or capital. However, in the case of trusts created prior to the di-
vorce or separation and not included thereto, the wife is required to include in
gross income only the amount of income of the trust which she is entitled to
receive and which, under existing law, would be taxed to the husband.
H.R. REP. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 46 (1942), in I SEIDMAN'S LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF FEDERAL INCOME AND ExcEss PROFITS TAX LAWS 1953-1939, at 1277
(1954)(emphasis added). Taxing the wife on all proceeds from an alimony trust
leads to the creation of income for the wife without an offsetting deduction for the
husband.
89. 416 F.2d 894 (6th Cir. 1969).
90. See Muriel Dodge Neeman, 26 T.C. 864 (1956). aff'd per curiam, 255 F.2d
841 (2d Cir.). cert. denied, 358 U.S. 841 (1958).
91. 370 U.S. 65 (1962). The Davis case holds that a transfer of appreciated
property in satisfaction of a marital obligation is a taxable event. The transfer of ap-
preciated property to alimony trusts creates problems because the transfer may do
more than satisfy a marital obligation, e.g., where the transferor retains a reversion-
ary interest or transfers a remainder interest to adult children. The Commissioner has
ruled that a transfer to an alimony trust can be a taxable event. Rev. Rul. 57-507.




possible from this hypothetical. (1) The husband recognizes a gain
when the trust is created, as implied by Davis. The wife's income
under Ellis would be limited to dividends plus the excess of the sale
price of shares sold over their market value on the date of creation of
the trust. (2) Same as (1) except that all payments to the wife are in-
come to her under Section 71. Thus the husband would have a capital
gain and the wife would have ordinary income even though payments
to her were from the corpus of the trust. (3) Same as (2) except that
the husband recognizes no gain on the creation of the trust. (4) Same
as (3) except that the wife's income, under Ellis, would include the
excess of the sale price of shares sold over their basis to the husband.
Because of the uncertain tax consequences, it is dangerous to create
an alimony trust. The preferable rule would appear to be the alterna-
tive described in (1) above. For the husband, the transfer to the trust
is not substantially different than a lump sum transfer of appreciated
property. Therefore, he should recognize gain on the transfer. Once
this is done, there is no reason to tax the wife differently than she
would be taxed if she owned the property outright. The approach sug-
gested would also make it clear that if the divorcing husband pur-
chases an annuity for his wife, she need not report as income that por-
tion of the annuity representing a return of the investment in the
contract. The legislative history of Section 71 does not support this ap-
proach, however, and there appears to be no case raising the issue of
whether the Davis case should apply to the transfer of appreciated
property to an alimony trust. If the husband retains no reversionary
interest in the trust, he should recognize gain if the wife has a general
power of appointment over the trust. If the husband retains a rever-
sionary interest or gives a remainder interest, it is unclear whether
gain would be recognized. In either event he should consider the pos-
sible estate and gift tax consequences.9 2
C. Arrearages and Settlements
The Tax Court has taken the position that "alimony in gross" is
92. Transfers made pursuant to written agreement within two years of divorce
create no gift tax liability to the extent they are for the support of the wife and mi-
nor children. I.R.C. § 2516. Part or all of property transferred in trust might be in-
cluded in the decedent's gross estate if he retains a reversionary interest, right to in-
come, right to designate who shall enjoy income, etc., I.R.C. §§ 2036-2038, 2043. But
cf. McMurtry v. Commissioner, 203 F.2d 659 (1st Cir. 1953) (implying a possible ex-
clusion to the extent qf the former wife's interest in the trust).
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neither deductible by the husband nor income to the wife.93 For ex-
ample, if a decree requires a husband to pay a wife $100 per week
until her death or remarriage, and to pay her a lump sum of $5,000
upon her remarriage, the $5,000 payment is not within the scope of
Sections 71 and 215. 94 Similarly, if payments are to be made over a
period of more than ten years from the date of the instrument, agree-
ment, or decree, the amount that is income to the wife (and therefore
deductible by the husband) cannot in any one year exceed ten percent
of the total amount payable. 95 Thus if a husband agrees to pay to the
wife the principal amount of $60,000, payable at the rate of $10,000
per year for five years and then at the rate of $1,000 per year for ten
years, the maximum amount deductible in each of the first five years is
$6,000 per year. 96 Payments of arrearages, however, do not appear to
be subject to these limitations. It seems well settled that arrearage
payments are deductible in the year paid to the same extent they
would have been deductible if they had been paid when due.97 This
rule gives a former husband the power to pay arrearages in high-
income years and, conversely, to bunch the income reportable by his
former wife. Perhaps the rule is necessary in order to encourage delin-
quent former husbands to pay alimony that is in arrears, but the prin-
cipal should not apply to advance payments. Accordingly, if a former
husband pays one lump sum in settlement of past, present, and future
alimony claims of his former wife, that portion of the settlement at-
tributable to past and present alimony obligations of the husband is
deductible by him (and income to the wife). The portion attributable
to future alimony should not be so treated, but the Internal Revenue
Service has ruled to the contrary where the nub of the settlement is to
compensate the wife for arrearages. 98
93. Gordon D. Oxford, 32 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1321 (1973).
94. See William M. Hardy, 59 T.C. 857 (1973).
95. I.R.C. § 71(c)(2).
96. SeeTreas. Reg. § 1.7 1-1(d)(5), Example (4) (1957).
97. Rev. Rul. 67-11, 1967-1 CuM. BULL. 15. See also Holloway v. United States,
428 F.2d 140 (9th Cir. 1970), in which a husband more than $100,000 behind in ali-
mony payments to his wife agreed to pay her $15,000 per year over a three-year period.
The district court held that because the payments were for future alimony, they
were not deductible. The circuit court of appeals reversed, holding that the nub of
the payment was for arrearages and was therefore deductible by the husband and in-
come to the wife.
98. Rev. Rul. 67-11, 1967-1 GUM. BULL. 15.
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D. Indirect Payments
Indirect payments are often the trivial aspects of a marriage disso-
lution. A former husband may be required to pay his wife's medical
expenses, to pay the attorney's fees incurred by her in obtaining the
divorce, to make payments on a home to which he or she has title, or
to purchase life insurance designating her as beneficiary in the event
of his death. All these matters require attention to detail.
1. Medical payments
It seems clear that payments by the husband of the wife's medical
expenses, including health insurance premiums, are periodic pay-
ments.99 They are deductible by the husband and are income to the
wife. The matter is noted here only to emphasize that even though the
wife must report these items as income, she may not deduct them if
she does not itemize her personal deductions or if they are made non-
deductible by the limitations of Section 213. The inclusion of this item
in the scope of Sections 71 and 215 also illustrates the fact that pay-
ments need not be made directly to the wife in order to be income to
her.
2. Attorney's fees
The question of the deductibility of attorney's fees is outside the
scope of this article. It is nevertheless considered in general terms be-
cause many divorce judgments, decrees, or agreements require one
spouse to pay the attorney's fees of the other, 100 presenting the ques-
tion of whether the person who pays such fees can deduct them under
Section 215. As a general rule, one who pays attorney's fees for assist-
ance given in connection with a divorce proceeding cannot deduct
those expenses because they are personal in nature.10' That portion of
99. This result follows even if the payments are irregular in amount and in the
times in which they are paid. See Rev. Rul. 62-106, 1962-2 CUM. BULL. 21.
100. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 26.09.140 (1974), authorizing a court to order
one party to pay the attorney's fees and costs of the other party under appropriate
circumstances.
101. Howard v. Commissioner, 202 F.2d 28 (9th Cir. 1953). Even if the expense
is incurred to prevent the other spouse from obtaining the income-producing property
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a fee that is attributable to the collection of income (i.e., alimony),
however, is deductible as an itemized personal deduction under Sec-
tion 212(1);102 and that portion of a fee attributable to tax advice is
deductible under Section 212(3).103 Other legal expenses are not de-
ductible but can sometimes be added to the taxpayer's basis in prop-
erty to the extent the costs of legal services are " 'incurred in de-
fending or perfecting taxpayer's claim to ownership of capital assets
... . ,"104 These exceptions should not obscure the fact that attor-
ney's fees incident to a divorce are generally not deductible, and
exceptions to the general rule of nondeductibility do not apply to
attorney's fees of the wife which are paid by the husband. Even if the
husband also pays alimony, his inability to deduct payments to the
wife's attorney is part of the more general judge-made rule that extra-
ordinary payments made in one year cannot qualify as "alimony"
simply because other periodic payments are also made in that year and
in other years. 105 It is also clear, however, that if payments are not "ex-
traordinary," they can come within the scope of Sections 71 and 215.
A husband could, for example, agree to pay his wife additional peri-
odic payments (the present value of which is equal to the attorney's
fees to be paid by the wife) and let the wife pay the attorney's fees.
Under this procedure the husband could deduct payments as they are
made. 10 6 The wife would report such payments as income but could
presumably deduct that portion of the attorney's fees allocable to the
collection of alimony income.
of the first spouse, the expense is not one to "conserve or maintain" income producing
property because the threat to the property has a personal rather than a business ori-
gin. United States v. Gilmore, 372 U.S. 39 (1963). However, in Carpenter v. United
States, 338 F.2d 366 (Ct. Cl. 1964), the court held that the part of the fee attribut-
able to reducing the post-dissolution tax burdens of the payor was deductible under
I.R.C. § 212(3).
102. Ruth K. Wild, 42 T.C. 706 (1964), acquiesced in, 1967-2 CuM. BULL. 4. See
also Gerald G. Wolfson, 47 T.C. 290 (1966).
103. See note 101 supra.
104. Gilmore v. United States, 245 F. Supp. 383 (N.D. Cal. 1965), quoting
Spangler v. Commissioner, 363 F.2d 913, 919 (9th Cir. 1963). This case involved the
same taxpayer who had been before the Supreme Court in 372 U.S. 39 (1963) and is
sometimes referred to as the "second Gilnore case." The theory of the case is that
even personal expenses can be capital expenses. For example, a person who improves
his home increases his basis.
105. See R. William Johnson, 30 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 580 (1971). Even if ali-
mony is paid, the additional payment of attorney's fees is nondeductible because it
is a "lump-sum payment for a definite nonrecurring purpose . . . ." F. Ewing Glas-
gow. 21 T.C. 211. 218 (1953), acquiesced in, 1954-1 CUM. BULL. 4.
106. But see James McEvoy, Jr., 21 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1441 (1962).
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3. Insurance
A husband's obligation to pay alimony to his wife usually termi-
nates upon his death. 107 This is not always true, but where the obliga-
tion does terminate upon death, and especially where periodic pay-
ments are intended to serve as child support without being specifically
so designated, the wife may understandably desire protection against
her former husband's death, premature or otherwise. Both parties may
desire to insure that post-death obligations will be paid if such obliga-
tions do survive the payor. Such protection may be obtained by re-
quiring that the payor obtain a stated amount of insurance designating
the payee as beneficiary.
If the wife is the absolute owner of all right, title, and interest in the
policy, premium payments made by the husband on the insurance are
deductible by the husband and must be reported as income by the
wife.'0 8 However, if the policy was in existence before the divorce, the
transfer of the policy to the wife may itself be a taxable event (unless
the transfer was part of an equal division of community property).10 9
Where the transfer is a taxable event (or even if not taxable where the
wife's basis in the policy is determined by reference to its value on the
date of transfer), the wife is considered to be a purchaser of the policy.
Her basis in the policy is its market value on the date of transfer" 0 plus
any premiums paid by the husband and taxed to her (or paid by her
directly). On the husband's death the excess of proceeds received over
her basis in the policy will be income to the wife."' However, the wife
would not be considered a "purchaser" if she received the policy pur-
suant to a nontaxable division of community property. In this event,
premiums paid by the husband would be deductible by him and in-
107. In Washington the obligation to pay alimony terminates on the death of
either party or upon the remarriage of the recipient, and child support terminates upon
the emancipation of the child or the death of the parent obligated for support "[u] n-
less otherwise agreed in writing or expressly provided in the decree." WASH. REV.
CODE § 26.09.170 (1974). Thus, alimony and child support obligations can by decree
be made to survive the death of the payor in Washington.
108. See Weil v. Commissioner, 240 F.2d 584 (2d Cir.) (by implication), cert.
denied, 353 U.S. 958 (1957); Rev. Rul. 70-218, 1970-1 CuM. BULL. 19.
109. See note 91 supra.
110. Farid-es-Sultaneh v. Commissioner, 160 F.2d 812 (2d Cir. 1947); Rev. Rul.
67-221, 1967-2 CuM. BULL. 63.
11I. Insurance proceeds are generally taxable to third parties who purchase in-
surance contracts despite the general exclusion of I.R.C. § 101. See I.R.C. §
101(a)(2). The gain should be taxed as ordinary income because there will have
been no "sale or exchange" of a capital asset. I.R.C. § 1222.
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come to her, but she would not realize gain or loss on his death." 12
Similarily, if the policy is initially obtained by the wife, premiums
paid by the husband would be deductible by him and income to her,
but her collection of the proceeds on his death would not be a taxable
event to her.
In many cases life insurance is, in effect, "alimony insurance." In
such cases the wife is named as beneficiary only if she survives the
husband (or possibly, only until a given number of years have expired
or a given number of periodic payments have been made) and the
husband retains certain other rights and interests in the policy. Courts
have adopted the rather artificial rule that in these cases premium
payments by the husband are not deductible by him and are not includ-
ible as income by the wife. 113 Where insurance is an important factor
and the parties wish to have the premium payments taxed to the wife
and deducted by the husband, the wife might purchase term insurance
on her husband with the policy expiring on her death or the occur-
rence of other stated events. Where this is done, the husband could
simply agree to pay the wife an additional amount designed to com-
pensate her for premium payments made by her. If the extra payments
were specifically earmarked as amounts to be spent by the wife for
insurance, the device might be disregarded by the courts, but if no
limitation is imposed on the wife's disposition of the excess payments,
they should fall within the scope of Sections 71 and 215.
4. Housing costs
In many marriage dissolution cases the husband or wife owns an
interest in a home. They may own that interest as co-owners or sepa-
112. A transferee whose basis in the policy is determined by reference to the
basis of the transferor is not a "purchaser." I.R.C. § 101(a)(2)(A). Basis is not af-
fected by a nontaxable division of community property. See Beth W. Corp. v. United
States, 350 F. Supp 1190 (S.D. Fla. 1972), aff'd per curiam, 481 F.2d 1401 (5th Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 916 (1974).
113. See Seligmann v. Commissioner, 207 F.2d 489 (7th Cir. 1953). See also
William C. Wright, 62 T.C. 377 (1974), in which the husband agreed to pay the
wife an amount in excess of $200,000 over a period of more than ten years. To se-
cure payment, he agreed to pay premiums on a policy on his life owned by the wife
and to keep the wife as beneficiary until she died, remarried, or attained the age of
65. The premiums were held not to be alimony. Language in Wright indicates that
premium payments are not income to the wife under I.R.C. § 71 unless they give
her a present "taxable economic benefit," id. at 399, and that such benefit would al-
ways be lacking if the insurance were only term insurance. That is, even if the wife
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rately, before or after the dissolution. For convenience, it is assumed
that the wife will occupy the home and that, if payments are made in
respect of that home, they will be made by the husband. The fol-
lowing three hypothetical situations illustrate the problems created by
indirect housing cost payments.
(1) In the first situation, the husband owns the home outright and is
required to permit the wife to reside in the home rent free. It is clear
that the husband need not report the rental value of the home as in-
come and that he cannot deduct that amount as "periodic payments"
made to the wife." 4 The husband will not be allowed a deduction for
the depreciation of the home because the rental value of the home is
not income to him. Even though the husband may not deduct (and the
wife need not include) the fair rental value of the home owned by the
husband and occupied by the wife, it is still unclear whether taxes and
maintenance payments made by the husband fall within the frame-
work of Sections 71 and 215.115 Taxes are presumably deductible by
the husband in any event, but if they are deductible as alimony, the
wife would have income. It is doubtful whether she could in turn de-
duct taxes paid on property she does not own. Moreover, the deduc-
tion would do her little good if her itemized deductions are otherwise
very small. The taxes paid by a husband in such a situation therefore
should not be treated as alimony but simply as payments of taxes by
the husband on his own property. It is not as easy to avoid conflict
where the husband is obligated to pay the maintenance and repair
costs of a home owned by him and occupied by the wife. Expenses
classified as capital expenses would not be income to the wife but
would increase the husband's basis in the house. 116 Expenses other
than capital expenses should be deductible by the husband and should
be income to the wife.117
were the owner of the policy without restriction and if premiums were payable until
the husband died, the premium payments might not be alimony. This view seems un-
duly restrictive. The effect can be avoided simply by paying additional alimony to the
wife and allowing her to purchase term insurance or not, as she sees fit.
114. This is so because the property is not held for production of income, I.R.C.
§ 167(a)(2), and the holding of the house by the husband is not an activity engaged
in for profit. Id. § 183. See, e.g., Pappenheimer v. Allen, 164 F.2d 428 (5th Cir. 1947).
115. See Doris B. Marinello, 54 T.C_ 577, 579 (1970). The court held that pay-
ments for rent and heat in a home occupied by the wife were income to her, even
though no payments were made directly to her. The home was owned by the hus-
band's wholly owned corporation to which he made rental payments.
116. Gentry v. United States, 283 F.2d 702 (Ct. Cl. 1960).
117. Rev. Rul. 62-39, 1962-1 CuM. BULL. 17.
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(2) In the second situation, the home is owned by the husband but
is subject to mortgage indebtedness. Payments of interest should be
deductible by the husband (under Section 163 rather than Section
215). Payments of mortgage principal would not be deductible. 11 8
(3) In the third situation, title to the property is in the name of the
wife. In this situation all payments made by the husband should fit
within the scope of Sections 71 and 215 unless the payments reflect a
purchase by the husband of an interest of the wife in other property
owned by the husband.' 19
The preceding discussion demonstrates that indirect payments raise
numerous problems that are avoided if payments are direct. If the
wife is to receive the benefits of payments for medical expenses, insur-
ance on the husband's life, attorney's fees, and housing, increasing the
amount of periodic payments, and making direct payments to the wife
are usually preferable to making indirect payments. The only possible
exception relates to housing. If the husband owns a home, overall
taxes might be reduced by permitting the wife to live in the home on a
rent-free basis because the imputed income equal to the rental value
of the home, in this event would probably be taxed to no one.
IV. PLANNING POST-DISSOLUTION CURRENT
PAYMENT ARRANGEMENTS
A. General Limitations
In some cases the form of post-dissolution current payments can
shift the burden of taxation from the former husband to the former
wife, or vice versa, and, in so doing, can reduce their aggregate tax
burden. But there are definite limits on what can be done. It has al-
ready been noted that post-dissolution installment payments made in
return for a pre-dissolution property interest of a former spouse
cannot be made to fall within the deduction-inclusion rules of Sections
118. James Park Bradley, 30 T.C. 701 (1958). See also Richards v. Commission-
er, 382 F.2d 538 (6th Cir. 1967); Neely B. Taylor, Jr., 45 T.C. 120 (1965), ac-
quiesced in result only, 1967-2 CuM. BULL. 3. In Taylor the husband deducted inter-
est and taxes. This deduction was not challenged. 45 T.C. at 129-30 (dissenting
opinion).
119. Compare Elbert G. Sharp, 31 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 795 (1972)(payments
treated as purchase of wife's interest in other property kept by husband), with Mace
v. United States, 64-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 93,682 (S.D. Cal. 1964) (husband's installment
payments deductible under I.R.C. § 71(c)(2)).
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71 and 215. The status of payments made for some reason other than
support but for something less than a property interest--such as pay-
ments in discharge of a wife's dower interest or interest in an unvested
pension right-remains unclear. Finally, Sections 71 and 215 cannot
override the basic principle of tax law that income realized during the
existence of a marital community will be taxed one-half to each
former spouse in a community property state, regardless of who col-
lects it.
More generally, current payment arrangements that save aggregate
taxes may not be the kind of arrangements that are favored by the
spouses or by local law. In high income households it may well be
preferable for tax purposes not to specify payments as payments for
child support, but both spouses might prefer such specification if, for
example, child support payment amounts are modifiable but mainte-
nance payment amounts are not. Finally, it may be virtually impos-
sible in some low income households to determine whether the specifi-
cation of amounts as child support does or does not save overall taxes
because of the interrelationships of the alimony deduction, the child
care deduction, the standard deduction, and the deductions for de-
pendency exemption allowances. Despite all these limitations, how-
ever, an attorney cannot afford to ignore the tax consequences of
post-dissolution current payment arrangements.
B. Families with Substantial Income
Families with substantial income may also have substantial prop-
erty. Where substantial property is owned prior to dissolution, it is
important to ascertain what the property interest of the wife is and
whether post-dissolution current payments made by the husband re-
flect the purchase of a property interest of the wife.120 The purchase
of a vested property interest should clearly be- cast in terms of a sale,
and adequate interest should be included in the subsequent pay-
ments. 21 The wife should also realize that she should elect to report her
120. See Part I supra.
121. If the husband purchases a vested property interest of the wife on the in-
stallment basis, I.R.C. § 483 clearly seems applicable. Providing for interest in the
settlement agreement brings to the attention of all concerned that a purchase and sale
was intended, and alerts both parties to the fact that interest must be reported by the
seller (and may be deducted by the buyer). Finally, a provision for interest gives the
parties the opportunity to allocate more or less of the purchase price to interest than
267
Washington Law Review Vol. 51: 233, 1976
gain (if any) on the installment basis, and that she may have to report
some imputed interest if an appropriate rate of interest is not provided
for separately.
Payments made in return for the release by the wife of her dower
rights create greater uncertainty. It is obvious that these payments, if
certain in amount, will not be income to the wife unless the require-
ments of Section 71 (c)(2) are met. If the payments are not income to
the wife because of the exclusionary rules of Section 71(c), the im-
puted interest rules of Section 483 do not apply. 122 If the payments
are uncertain in amount (e.g., because they will terminate on the
wife's death or remarriage), or if they are to be made over a period of
more than ten years, existing uncertainty might prompt settlements
based on the assumption that the payments are income to the wife and
deductible by the husband. In such cases, appropriate provisions
should be made for indemnification of the husband or modification of
the decree, instrument, or agreement in the event such payments sub-
sequently are held not to be income to the wife or deductible by the
husband.123
would be the case if no interest were provided. See Treas. Reg. § 1.483-1(b)(2)
(1971). Although there is some confusion, it appears that the imputed interest rules
apply only to situations where one spouse purchases a vested property interest of the
other. Gerlach v. United States, 74-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 84,052 (Ct. Cl. 1973). If §§ 71
& 215 do not apply because one spouse has "purchased" an inchoate property right
of the other (e.g., dower or similar interest), one court has held that the imputed in-
terest rules of § 483 do not apply. Fox v. United States, 510 F.2d 1330 (3d Cir.
1975). The Fox case implies that I.R.C. § 483 never applies to payments made pursu-
ant to a property settlement, but the facts in Fox involved payments made over a pe-
riod of 9 / years in return for the wife's inchoate marital rights. The payments to the
wife in Fox were not income to her. If the payout period had been more than ten
years, the wife would have been subject to tax under I.R.C. § 71(c)(1), and the hus-
band could have deducted the payments under I.R.C. § 215.
122. Fox v. United States, 510 F.2d 1330 (3d Cir. 1975).
123. If an agreement or decree designates maintenance as an installment purchase
of property, the purchaser nevertheless later may deduct the so-called installment
purchases as alimony. If the wife does not report them as income, the Internal Reve-
nue Service is bound to interfere. See A.J. Roberts, 33 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 750
(1974). Conversely, payments might be labeled alimony, or described in such a way
as literally to fit the requirements of I.R.C. § 71(c)(2). If the husband deducts these
payments under I.R.C. § 215 but the wife does not report them as income, the In-
ternal Revenue Service again is likely to interfere. See Soltermann v. United States.
272 F.2d 387 (9th Cir. 1959). If the parties arrive at an honest agreement that a
recipient should or should not report payments as alimony, that agreement does not
bind the government. But if the parties also agree that one spouse will indemnify the
other for unexpected tax consequences, the indemnitor will be much less likely to re-
port income or deductions in a manner contrary to that implied by the agreement. In




Families with substantial income and dependent children have a
further reason to consider the relative merits of labeling current pay-
ments as "alimony" or "child support." Assuming the husband will
itemize his personal deductions even without an alimony deduction,
the deduction for alimony is likely to be of greater tax benefit to him
than the dependency exemptions for the children. 124 The children in
such event probably would be the dependents of the wife, who would
report the alimony as income. Because they are the wife's dependents,
she would be eligible for the child care deduction of Section 214. If
the payments are specifically labeled as child support, the husband
gets no deduction for alimony and is likely to claim the children as his
dependents. If his claim is successful, the children cannot be claimed
by the wife and, if they cannot be claimed by her, she loses the bene-
fits of the child care deduction of Section 214.125
C. Families with Low Incomes
As presently written, the tax laws tend to exacerbate conflict be-
tween low income parents who divorce. The noncustodial parent in a
low income family may well prefer to designate payments specifically
as child support, and insist that, in return for such payments, the de-
pendency exemptions be awarded to him because:126 (1) the amounts
paid may be close to the dollar amount of the dependency exemption
allowances; and (2) he may utilize the standard deduction (or low in-
come allowance) because he has few itemized personal deductions.
Thus the deduction of Section 215 may be of less value to him than
the dependency exemption allowance of Section 151 (which can be
taken in addition to the standard deduction or low income allow-
ance).127 The wife, however, may insist that the payments to her be
designated alimony. She would thus have income but would also
usually be able to claim the children as her dependents. If she can
124. This statement is correct provided the husband pays more than $750 per
year in child support.
125. I.R.C. § 214(b)(1)(A). See notes 66-73 and accompanying text supra.
126. This consideration becomes even more crucial under § 203 of the Tax Re-
duction Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-12, 89 Stat. 29 (now codified as I.R.C. § 42),
which (for the 1975 calendar year) grants an additional credit of $30 per dependency
exemption allowance. This additional credit was extended into the first six months of
1976 by § 2(e) of the Revenue Adjustment Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-164, 89
Stat. 972.
127. See I.R.C. §§ 62 & 63.
269
Washington Law Review
claim the children as her dependents she will also be entitled to deduct
qualified child care expenses under Section 214. In high income fami-
lies, attorneys may be able to propose a solution which will reduce
aggregate taxes and suggest methods of allocating the reduction. It is
less clear that this can be done in low income households.128
V. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
A. Distinguishing Periodic Payments from Property Purchases
The law in this area should be certain. It has been suggested in this
article that "periodic" payments should be governed by Sections 71
and 215 unless they represent the installment purchase of a vested
property interest of one spouse. The certainty advocated in this article
involves an expense in terms of parity between community property
and common law property states in this respect: wives in common law
property states will have fewer vested property interests than wives in
community property states. If payments for inchoate rights can be
made deductible, taxpayers in common law property states will have
more flexibility than taxpayers in community property states. A
former husband could obtain a deduction for installment payments for
an interest that is similar to the "vested" property interest but is not
such an interest by accident of local law. This situation may well
change, however, as more wives are employed outside the home and
obtain property interests that are in fact vested under local law. The
Imel case discussed in this article may not be an aberration; it may be
a harbinger. 29 Moreover, the uncertainty created by Bernatschke,
Waller, and similar cases can become nearly intolerable in cases in-
volving payments for items that may be property for local law pur-
poses but that are treated as mere rights to income, or even mere ex-
pectancies, for federal tax purposes.
B. Maintenance and Child Support
In middle and high income households, divorce can lead to a de-
128. In substantial income households the husband might be willing (and able)
to make more and larger payments if the payments are not specifically designated
child support. In low income households the reverse might well be the case.
129. See note 36 supra and Hjorth, Community Property Marital Settlements:
The Problem anda Proposal, 50 WASH. L. REV. 231, 234-35 (1975).
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creased aggregate tax burden if current payments are called mainte-
nance rather than child support. The wisdom of a tax law that argu-
ably favors divorce over marriage is doubtful. The wisdom of a tax
law that prefers maintenance over child support is even more
doubtful. The problem is more severe in low income households be-
cause the interrelationships of the maintenance deduction, child care
deduction, standard deduction, and dependency exemption provisions
make it almost impossible for even the most sophisiticated tax lawyer
to plan post-dissolution payment arrangements that are just and equi-
table. Many of these problems could be solved by the following legis-
lative changes:
(1) Change the maintenance deduction of Section 215 and the
child care deduction of Section 214 to credits, or to deduc-
tions that are allowable in computing adjusted gross income.
Present law, which allows these items only as deductions in
lieu of the standard deduction, discriminates in favor of those
with high incomes who would itemize deductions even if they
did not have deductions under Section 215 or Section 214.
(2) Grant the deduction (or credit) of Section 214 to the cus-
todial parent who actually pays the expense so long as the
child involved is the dependent of one of the two parents.
Under this change, a working mother could claim the deduc-
tion (or credit) even if she claims the standard deduction and
even if the child involved is the dependent of the noncus-
todial parent by virtue of Section 152(e).
These changes would undoubtedly lead to some loss of revenue. They
are required, however, if low income taxpayers are to obtain the same
benefits already granted to high income taxpayers.
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